

FROM HEIN—

The Fundamental Guide to Argument, Proof and Evidence

STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ARGUMENT AND PROOF
Cases, Materials and Analyses
SECOND EDITION



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Covington's latest work provides an introduction to argument, proof and evidence analyzed in terms of classical logic. The author's First Edition served for more than a decade as the primary text for law school instruction in *Logic of Law and Evidence*. It is valued as an especially critical resource for studies in legal theory and writing.

This work introduces the reader to theories of proof used in trials and provides methods for analyzing legal rules and abstractions that are essential to understanding legal studies. It begins with a discussion of common defective reasoning—fallacies (faulty references)—as they sometimes appear in legal reasoning. An able advocate will know how to defeat analytically the false dilemma, *post hoc*, bootstrapping, the faulty inference by syllogism, and many others. Intuitively, one senses fallacy as an offense to sound reasoning, but critical analysis can make the defect glaringly apparent to a judge or jury.

Professor Covington explains that **legal reasoning is not as complex as the novice might believe** it to be. With just two major forms of reasoning (inductive and deductive) and four kinds of argument (hypothesis, syllogism, analogy and generalization), the structures of argument and proof are limited. Law instructors, students and librarians will find this text to be an invaluable tool. Order yours from Hein today!

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Summary of Contents



Summary of Contents

Detailed Contents

Preface

Acknowledgments

Table of Cases

Chapter 1. INFERENCE, ARGUMENT AND FALLACY IN LAW

How Many Ways Can You Argue and How Good Must the Argument Be?

The Two Ways to Make Inference: Inductive and Deductive

Faulty Argument: Unacceptable Inference Is Called Fallacy

The Required Analysis: Identify Faulty Inference and Show Why It is Bad

Restatement of Major Points

Defective Inference, Faulty Premises, or Both?

Law, Evidence, and Proof in Witchcraft Trials

A Comparison of Scientific Method and Legal Method: Science

Searches for Truth, Law Resolves Controversies

The Logical Mill of Trial in the 17th Century and Today

Comments on Chapter One

Summary on Chapter One

Additional Reading

Chapter 2. THE HYPOTHESIS: PROVING FACTS AT TRIAL

The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Hypothesis in Trial Proof

The Search for Truth: Law and the Philosophers

A Short Review of the Search for Truth

The Model of the Hypothesis

Permitted Doubt and Required Belief on the Point Probability Scale

Direct and Circumstantial Evidence and Weight of Evidence

Proof by Convergence: *The Webber Case*

The Hypothesis in the *Webber Case*

The Lindbergh Baby Case: *State v. Hauptmann*

Reconstruction of the Trial Hypothesis

The “Two Or More Inference Steps” Test for Circumstantial Evidence

Relevance and Weight of Evidence Are Different Ideas

Inference Steps Are a Component of Weight: The “Love Letter” Case

How Courts Define Probability in Legal Proof

Intuition and Critical Analysis in Jury Fact-Finding

Belief Can Be Reduced to Components and Stated in Probability Figures

Matrix of Degrees of Belief from Knowledge to Disbelief

A summation of Ideas about Evidence and Proof at Trial

The Problem of Inference-on-Inference

The Paradox: Intuition and Critical Analysis Yield Different Results

A Suggested Analysis of the *Sargent Case*

Proof Points (1-4) and Disproof Points (A-D) in Plaintiff’s Burden of Proof

Hearsay Is a Special Inference-on-Inference Problem

An Overview of Testimonial Hearsay under FRE 801-803

The Role of the Generalization in the Hypothesis

A Few Techniques for Proving and Defeating the Hypothesis:

The Scientific Method

Arguments from Difference, Agreement and Variation

The Riddle of Causation in the Tort Hypothesis: The Concept of Proximate Cause

Summary of Major Points in Chapter Two

Additional Reading

Chapter 3. THE SYLLOGISM: HOW LEGAL RULES ARE STATED AND APPLIED

PART ONE: Analysis of the Syllogism

The Parts of the Syllogism

Good and Bad Argument: Validity and Invalidity of Deductive Conclusions

The Syllogism Uses the Method of Classing

The Inherent Uncertainty of Legal Fact Finding

Appellate Opinions Test Syllogistic Argument Using Critical Analysis

Another Note on the Categorical Syllogism

PART TWO: Analysis of Legal Rules

The Meaning of Rules: Any Legal Rule Can Be Stated in the If-Then Form (The Binary Path Method of Analysis)

Chart Drafting and Chart Use Problems

Summary of the Binary Path Analysis Method

Primitives Are Also Used in Rule Analysis

Ambiguity and Rule Analysis

Analysis of Definition

Summary on the Nature of Rules

Comments on Chapter Three

Summary of Major Points in Chapter Three

Additional Reading

Chapter 4. APPLYING AND CREATING RULES BY ANALOGY

The Uses of Analogy in Legal Reasoning

A Short Review of the Doctrine of Precedent (*Stare Decisis*)

The Structure of Analogy

Two Ways of Reasoning by Analogy: The Model as a “Rule” or as “Data”

Problem: Bacon’s Argument That Foreign War Is Beneficial

Creation of New Law by Analogy to Old Cases

The Danger of the Facile Analogy

Is There an Analytical Method that Will Help to Avoid the Facile Analogy?

Summary of Major Points in Chapter Four

Additional Reading

Chapter 5. PROBABILITY AND POSSIBILITY IN LEGAL PROOF

Mathematical Probability in Trial Proof

Proof Claims from Unsupported to Necessary: The Probability Minimum

Probability Rather than Possibility as a Standard for Fact-Finding

Introduction to Probability Theory

A Short Description of *A Priori* Probability

A Review of Probability Terms and an Algorithm for Selecting a Rule for Simple *A Priori* Probability

Paradox in Use of Probability Theory in Trial

Hypothetical Problem One—Two Independent Issues

Hypothetical Problem Two—Three Sequential, Independent Issues

Practical Considerations about Use of Probability Theory in Trial: Three Uses for Bayes’ Theorem

Permitted Doubt and Required Belief on the Point Probability Scale

Summary of Major Points in Chapter Five

Additional Reading

Appendix 1. The Benefit-Burden Analysis of Wesley Hohfeld

Appendix 2. Charts and Diagrams

Appendix 3. Glossary of Terms

Index

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